Lawrence "Larry" Summers
After Harvard Economics Professor Shleifer reached a settlement with the US. Government because of his illegal stock-buying activities in post-Soviet Russia, President Summers was accused of extreme favoritism towards his well-known friend. In January of 2006, an article in the "Institutional Investor" suggested that Summers forewarned and shielded Shleifer and his wife to protect them from disciplinary action from the University. Harvard picked up the tab for Shleifer, and the University agreed to pay $26.5 million to the US Government to settle the lawsuit. Shleifer was allowed to return to his faculty position, inciting outrage among faculty and students of Harvard. On February 21, 2006, Summers announced his intention to step down as President of the University in response to the outrage. This situation reflects the complexity of the interplay between Economics, University, and Russia in the world.
Linda Buehler
Graham, David A. "How a Small Team of Democrats Defeated Larry Summers—and Obama." The Atlantic. Atlantic Media Company, published September 15, 2013. Accessed May 6, 2014. <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/how-a-small-team-of-democrats-defeated-larry-summers-and-obama/279688/>
August 1996- February 2006
The Purchase of Russian Alaska
<p>Although the American purchase of Alaska occurred after the Civil War, the treaty came about as a result of the same diplomatic circumstances that brought about Russo-American cooperation during the Civil War. The antagonism between Russia and Britain had played a significant role in fostering Russia’s open diplomatic support for the Union, and fears of war over Poland had driven Russia to send its fleet on their 1863 visit to the United States.</p>
<p>In fact, Russia had been hoping to dispose of Alaska in some way even before the Civil War, out of fear that the United Kingdom could easily seize it.<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alaska%20Item.docx#_ftn1">[1]</a> Selling the territory to the United States, according to both Clay and the Russian minister to the United States, would in fact play a dual role in countering British power on the Pacific. In addition to keeping Alaska out of the hands of the British, the sale of Alaska may have been driven by the hope of “expulsion of England from the whole Pacific coast of North America.”<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alaska%20Item.docx#_ftn2">[2]</a> As with Russian alignment against Britain and France during the Civil War, the exigencies of geopolitics played a significant role in fostering this agreement over Alaska.</p>
<p>Famously, the purchase of Alaska by the United States was greeted with much derision at the time. Despite some public outcry over purchasing the “Russian Fairyland,”<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alaska%20Item.docx#_ftn3">[3]</a> the annexation of Alaska was indeed secured in 1867 for the sum of $7.2 million.<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alaska%20Item.docx#_ftn4">[4]</a></p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alaska%20Item.docx#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Benjamin Platt Thomas, <em>Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867</em>. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), 145.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alaska%20Item.docx#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <em>Ibid</em>, 165n66.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alaska%20Item.docx#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Thomas A. Bailey. <em>America Faces Russia </em>(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950)<em>, </em>103.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alaska%20Item.docx#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <em>Ibid¸ </em>102.</p>
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Samuel Coffin
<div>
<p>Thomas A. Bailey. <em>America Faces Russia. </em>Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950.<br /><br />Benjamin Platt Thomas, <em>Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867</em>. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.</p>
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1867
The Russian Fleet Comes to America
<p> On September 24, 1863, Russian ships suddenly appeared off the coast of New York City. Although the appearance of a foreign navy during the Civil War might seem to have been menacing, both the American government and private society welcomed the presence of the Russian fleet.</p>
<p> Both the diplomatic reception to an unexpected naval visit and the lavish private receptions in New York City demonstrate the extent to which Russia had been established as a friendly power. One reception for the Russian officers served “twelve thousand oysters, twelve hundred game birds, and three thousand five hundred bottles of wine.”<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Russian%20Fleet%20Item.docx#_ftn1">[1]</a> The official receptions were no less dramatic, and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles gave the Russians open access to visit the Brooklyn navy yard.<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Russian%20Fleet%20Item.docx#_ftn2">[2]</a> In December, Secretary Seward received the Russians in Washington, D.C., and Mary Todd Lincoln herself gave “a toast to the health of the Czar.”<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Russian%20Fleet%20Item.docx#_ftn3">[3]</a> The warm reception reiterated the level of friendship between the two countries, such that a Russian fleet could suddenly arrive on the East Coast and be feted.</p>
<p> Russia’s dispatch of ships to New York, and later San Francisco, came not necessarily as a show of support for the Union, but rather out of fear of British and French intervention in Poland. Since the United States had declined interest in intervention on behalf of the Polish rebels, the Russian fleet seemed much safer near American waters than directly facing British and French navies.<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Russian%20Fleet%20Item.docx#_ftn4">[4]</a> For the Russians, fostering a sense of good will was important, but secondary to their goal of keeping their navy intact in case of a war with Britain and France.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Russian%20Fleet%20Item.docx#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Albert A. Woldman. <em>Lincoln and the Russians. </em>(Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952), 146.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Russian%20Fleet%20Item.docx#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <em>Ibid</em>, 141.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Russian%20Fleet%20Item.docx#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <em>Ibid</em>, 147.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Russian%20Fleet%20Item.docx#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Benjamin F. Gilbert, “Welcome to the Czar’s Fleet.” <em>California Historical Society Quarterly</em> 26, no. 1 (Mar. 1947): 13.</p>
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Samuel Coffin
<div>
<p>Benjamin F. Gilbert, “Welcome to the Czar’s Fleet.” <em>California Historical Society Quarterly</em> 26, no. 1 (Mar. 1947): 13-19</p>
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<div>
<p>Albert A. Woldman. <em>Lincoln and the Russians. </em>Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952.</p>
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September 1863-April 1864
"Reactionary, Catholic and Despotic Poland."
<p> The Polish Insurrection demonstrates the extent to which American diplomacy prioritized a strong relationship with Russia during the Civil War. In January 1863, protests against conscription in Poland exploded into a general rebellion against Russian rule.<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Polish%20Item.docx#_ftn1">[1]</a> The official diplomatic response of the United States reveals both the geopolitical conception of Russia as an unofficial ally and the perception of Alexander II as a respectable and just ruler.</p>
<p> Since the <em>realpolitik</em> of European relations in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century had already shaped the progression of Russo-American relations, unsurprisingly the relationships between Britain, France, the United States, and Russia would shape American policy regarding Poland. In May, Britain and France requested that the United States join an official statement of disapproval.<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Polish%20Item.docx#_ftn2">[2]</a> As discussed, Britain and France had become the unofficial counterbalance to the <em>de facto</em> alignment of the United States and Russia, and therefore the American refusal to intervene reinforced this friendship.</p>
<p> The language of American diplomats at that time, however, reveals that American unity was not simply a practical response to geopolitics. In his official response to the French, Secretary of State William Seward referenced the “enlightened and humane character” of Alexander II, so described for his emancipation of the serfs and “effective administration of justice.”<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Polish%20Item.docx#_ftn3">[3]</a> Such high language demonstrated the respect for Russia that the American government openly espoused, especially in light of its own recent emancipation. Somewhat less appealing was the private comment of Cassius Clay, minister to Russia. In a reply to Seward in June 1863, Clay contrasted “<em>liberal </em>Russia” with “<em>reactionary</em>, Catholic and despotic Poland.”<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Polish%20Item.docx#_ftn4">[4]</a> At least privately, enthusiasm for Russia both as an ally and a fellow emancipator could lead American diplomats to criticize the Polish insurrection as the enemy of progressive Russian rule.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Polish%20Item.docx#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Joseph Wieczerzak, “American Reactions to the Polish Insurrection.” <em>Polish-American Studies</em> 22, no. 2. (Jul.-Dec., 1965): 92.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Polish%20Item.docx#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Benjamin Platt Thomas, <em>Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867</em>. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930)<em>, </em>136-137.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Polish%20Item.docx#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <em>Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs</em>. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 667.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Polish%20Item.docx#_ftnref4">[4]</a> “American Reactions to the Polish Insurrection,” 94.</p>
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Samuel Coffin
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<p><em>Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs</em>. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864.</p>
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<div>
<p>Benjamin Platt Thomas, <em>Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867</em>. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.<br /><br />Joseph Wieczerzak, “American Reactions to the Polish Insurrection.” <em>Polish-American Studies</em> 22, no. 2. (Jul.-Dec., 1965): 90-98.</p>
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January 1863-1864
Cassius Clay, Minister to Russia
<p> Cassius Marcellus Clay served as minister to Russia for two terms: first from July 14, 1861 to June 25, 1862, and again from May 7, 1863 to October 1, 1869. His tenure as minister was marked by a successful alignment of Russia with American interests during the Civil War. Clay himself seemed an unusual choice for the ministry to Russia, and it seems that his appointment to a diplomatic position was a political reward for his loyal campaigning for Lincoln.<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Cassius%20Clay%20Item.docx#_ftn1">[1]</a> Clay himself was unique as a Kentucky Republican and abolitionist, and he was also known as a “firebrand” who carried “a bowie knife and two pistols” for his own defense.<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Cassius%20Clay%20Item.docx#_ftn2">[2]</a></p>
<p> However, these attributes seem not to have impaired his mission or the general state of Russo-American relations. Clay in fact was one of the most ideological supporters of Russia, and he never hesitated to tell both Americans and Russians that the two nations were united by more than diplomatic necessity. Upon the return of the Russian fleet from the United States, Clay explained the warm welcome given to them as American recognition of the “common cause in the advancement of humanity.”<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Cassius%20Clay%20Item.docx#_ftn3">[3]</a> Although the natural alignment of Russia and the United States against Britain and France meant that good relations were bound to occur, Clay’s efforts went beyond not doing anything to impair that friendship. The gun-toting Kentuckian’s high praise of Russia provided the most forceful defense of Russo-American friendship in the Lincoln administration.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Cassius%20Clay%20Item.docx#_ftnref1">[1]</a> John Kuhn Bliemaier, “Cassius Marcellus Clay in St. Petersburg.” <em>The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society</em> 73, no. 3 (July, 1975): 264.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Cassius%20Clay%20Item.docx#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Benjamin Platt Thomas, <em>Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867</em>. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930)<em>, </em>104.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Cassius%20Clay%20Item.docx#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Alexander Tarsaidze, <em>Czars and Presidents. </em>(New York: Mcdowell Obolensky, 1958), 222.</p>
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Samuel Coffin
<div>
<p>John Kuhn Bliemaier, “Cassius Marcellus Clay in St. Petersburg.” <em>The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society</em> 73, no. 3 (July, 1975): 263-287.</p>
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<p>Alexander Tarsaidze, <em>Czars and Presidents. </em>New York: Mcdowell Obolensky, 1958.<br /><br />Benjamin Platt Thomas, <em>Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867</em>. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.</p>
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1861-1862, 1863-1869
Trent Affair
<p> Although the “Trent Affair” did not directly involve Russia, the affair demonstrated the need for the United States to bolster its diplomatic presence against British and French interests. In November 1861, the British government reacted angrily to news that an American ship had intercepted the British ship <em>Trent</em>. An American warship stopped the <em>Trent,</em> in international waters, in order to intercept “John Slidell and James Mason, Confederate emissaries to Paris and London, respectively.”<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Trent%20Affair%20Item.docx#_ftn1">[1]</a> Britain demanded recompense for what it considered an illegal seizure of a British ship, and ultimately the United States released Slidell and Mason on the basis that “one war at a time” was a prudent measure.<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Trent%20Affair%20Item.docx#_ftn2">[2]</a> Even with the peaceful resolution, the incident highlighted the extent of Confederate efforts to sway European powers and the less-than-favorable position that the United States held in British opinion.</p>
<p> Since the Russian government had already extended its first words of support by 1861, Russia was certainly pleased to see the United States avoid open war with Britain. The Russian minister to the United States passed along a note of congratulations and reassurance “of the cordial sympathy which united the two countries.”<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Trent%20Affair%20Item.docx#_ftn3">[3]</a> To emphasize this point on the world stage, the Russian government likewise sought permission from Cassius Clay to “have [the congratulations] printed in the Journal de St Petersbourg in order that it might exercise a favorable influence on European opinion.”<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Trent%20Affair%20Item.docx#_ftn4">[4]</a> In going to such public lengths to emphasize Russo-American friendship, the Russian government gave its reassurance that it supported the United States against British and French enmity.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Trent%20Affair%20Item.docx#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Albert A. Woldman. <em>Lincoln and the Russians. </em>(Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952), 92.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Trent%20Affair%20Item.docx#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <em>Ibid</em>, 93.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Trent%20Affair%20Item.docx#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Benjamin Platt Thomas, <em>Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867</em>. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), 126.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Trent%20Affair%20Item.docx#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <em>Ibid</em>.</p>
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Samuel Coffin
<div>
<p>Benjamin Platt Thomas, <em>Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867</em>. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.<br /><br />Albert A. Woldman. <em>Lincoln and the Russians. </em>Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952.</p>
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November 1861
Alexander II, Tsar and Emancipator
<p> Alexander II, as the Tsar-Emancipator, provided ideological abolitionists with a new face of Russia that could dispel the previous notions of Russian autocracy and despotism. As noted in the exhibit, Alexander II signed a declaration of emancipation on March 3, 1861. The emancipation of the serfs played a great role in boosting esteem of him among abolitionist Americans as a fellow reformer against forces supporting the regressive Confederacy. Thus, Edward Everett, a Massachusetts politician (and president of Harvard University),<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alexander%20II%20Item.docx#_ftn1">[1]</a> wrote in glowing terms of the “enlightened Prince” who gave his support to the Union against a Confederacy openly avowing its foundation on “the cornerstone of Slavery.”<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alexander%20II%20Item.docx#_ftn2">[2]</a> Cassius Clay would echo such praise after his own personal encounters with the Tsar. He told one American audience in 1862 that “not only Alexander, but <em>his whole family are with you</em>, men, women, and children.”<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alexander%20II%20Item.docx#_ftn3">[3]</a> Even if much of the Russo-American alignment had been built on resisting Britain and France, American abolitionists saw Alexander II as a personal friend and one of the few world leaders advocating a process of reform similar to that of American emancipation.</p>
<p> </p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alexander%20II%20Item.docx#_ftnref1">[1]</a> “Everett, Edward.” <em>Biographical Directory of the United States Congress</em>. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=E000264</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alexander%20II%20Item.docx#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Edward Everett. “The Sympathy of Russia with the United States, Views of Edward Everett,” <em>New York Herald, </em> reprinted in <em>New York Times, </em>October 15, 1861.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Alexander%20II%20Item.docx#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Benjamin Platt Thomas, <em>Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867</em>. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930)<em>, </em>129.</p>
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Samuel Coffin
<div>
<p>Edward Everett. “The Sympathy of Russia with the United States, Views of Edward Everett,” <em>New York Herald, </em> reprinted in <em>New York Times, </em>October 15, 1861.<br /><br />"Everett, Edward.” <em>Biographical Directory of the United States Congress</em>. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=E000264</p>
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<div>
<p>Benjamin Platt Thomas, <em>Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867</em>. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.</p>
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March 3, 1861
The Crimean War and Russo-American Relations
<p> During the mid-1850s, the events of the Crimean War expanded what had been minimal interaction between the United States and Russia. Although the United States remained neutral during the war, the question of shipping neutrality first raised the notion that the United States and Russia could benefit from working in concert to resist British influence. The United States, throughout the war, made known to Britain and France its principle that “free ships make free goods” and that American trade, as a non-belligerent power, would not halt in Russia.<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Crimean%20War%20Item.docx#_ftn1">[1]</a> Fortunately, the Crimean War passed without this becoming an active point of contention between Britain and the United States. The war still served as a hint that even before British and French involvement in the Civil War, the United States might be served by finding a counterbalance to those two countries in Russia.</p>
<p> The sudden flurry of diplomatic activity between the United States and Russia likewise helped to give American and Russian diplomats familiarity with each other. The Russian minister to the United States at this time, Eduard de Stoeckl, would later serve throughout the Civil War period.<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Crimean%20War%20Item.docx#_ftn2">[2]</a> Stoeckl would prove to be a key intermediary between the two countries, and he did not hesitate to make public the diplomatic notes of friendship between his two countries.<a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Crimean%20War%20Item.docx#_ftn3">[3]</a> Given the positive state of relations between the two countries as a result of the Crimean War, in 1861 the United States and Russia were well-primed for further conciliation against potential British and French threats.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Crimean%20War%20Item.docx#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Benjamin Platt Thomas, <em>Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867</em>. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), 112.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Crimean%20War%20Item.docx#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Frank A. Golder, “Russo-American Relations during the Crimean War.” <em>The American Historical Review</em>, 31 no. 3 (April 1926): 463.</p>
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<p><a title="" href="file:///C:/Users/Samuel/Dropbox/Harvard/SW%2052/Final%20Project/Crimean%20War%20Item.docx#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Albert A. Woldman. <em>Lincoln and the Russians. </em>(Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952), 130.</p>
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</div>
Samuel Coffin
<p>Frank A. Golder, “Russo-American Relations during the Crimean War.” <em>The American Historical Review</em>, 31 no. 3 (April 1926): 462-476.<br /><br />Benjamin Platt Thomas, <em>Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867</em>. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.</p>
<p>Albert A. Woldman. <em>Lincoln and the Russians. </em>Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952.</p>
1854-1856
Complementary Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation
Amur Region, Part 5
After treaties in 1991 and 2001 were not able to complete define the disputed border between the Russian Federation and the Republic of China, the two states were party to the Complementary Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Eastern Section of the China–Russia Boundary in 2004. The disputed territories were islands at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. Possession of the two islands was significant for military control of the Amur region, as the Russian city of Khabarovsk is in close proximity to the disputed border. China wished for the boundary to be the channel north of the islands, resulting in China’s possession of Bolshoy Ussuriyski and Tarabarov Island. Russia insisted that, consistent with the 1860 Treaty of Beijing, the southern channel should make up the boundary, allowing for Russian possession of the islands.
Once negotiations were concluded, Tarabarov Island and part of the Abagaitu Islet were relinquished by Russia, and Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island was divided in half. The agreement was ratified in 2005, and it came into effect on October 14, 2008. In both the Russian Federation and the Republic of China, the agreement was unpopular because of the mutual loss of territory. Russian Cossacks protested the division of Bolshoy Ussuriyski Island in 2005. Media outlets in Taiwain and Hong Kong were critical of the agreement, as they felt the islands were Chinese territory forever lost to Russia. Furthermore, Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island is still claimed by Taiwan. Despite the unpopularity of the agreement, the Russian Federation and the Republic of China consider the agreement to be a success. The border between the two states is now definitively declared, and economic cooperation in the region has been increased.
Group 3
Morris-Suzuki, Tessa, Morris Low, et al. East Asia Beyond the History Wars: Confronting the Ghosts of Violence. 1st ed. New York: Routledge, 2013. 31-33. Print.
Guo, Rongxing. Cross-Border Resource Management. 2nd ed. Oxford: Elsevier, 2012. 216-217. Print.
Wiegand, Krista. Enduring Territorial Disputes. 1st. ed. Athens: University of Georgia, 2011. 240-241. Print.
Picture: http://www.economist.com/node/11792951
October 14, 2004
The Treaty of Aigun
Amur Region, Part 2
The Amur region grew in importance for Russia during the 1850s. Count Nikolas Muravyov-Amursky led expeditions into the region during the first part of the decade, and during the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the Russian presence in the Amur region was expanded significantly. The Amur River became an important waterway for the Russian military as gateway to the Pacific, and several military outposts were built. With the increased settlement, the region was virtually controlled by Russia. China was unable to respond militarily to the challenge. While Russia was establishing outposts and assuming control of the nearby maritime region, China was taking part in a number of devastating conflicts. The Taiping Rebellion of 1850-1864, which wiped out a large number of Chinese citizens, coupled with the Second Anglo-Chinese War of 1856-1860, provided Russia with the opportunity to gain new territory in the frontier along the border.
The Treaty of Aigun, named after the Chinese town in which it was signed, was concluded in May 1858. The signers were the Russian Count Muravyov-Amursky and the Manchu official Yishan. As part of the treaty, Russia received all land north of the Amur River. Another large part of land to the east of the Ussuri River was also given to Russia. The Treaty of Aigun amounted to an estimated two million miles of new territory for Russia. In addition to territory, Russia gained more control over regional trade and near exclusivity in the use of the Amur, Ussuri, and Sungari Rivers. Two years later, the terms of the Treaty of Aigun would be confirmed in the Treaty of Beijing, which established the Ussuri River as the border between Russia and China. Despite the Treaty of Aigun and the Treaty of Beijing, the border between Russia and China was not agreed upon in manner precise enough as to prevent future conflict. China was fully aware that it had been forced into the Treaty of Aigun, and border disputes continued into the 20th century.
Group 3
Tzou, Byron. China and International Law: The Boundary Disputes. 1st. ed. New York: Praeger, 1990. 47-48. Print.
" Russia and China end 300 year old border dispute." BBC World News (1997): BBC News. Web. 12 Feb 2014. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/analysis/29263.stm.
"Russian-Chinese Treaty of Aigun concluded 155 years ago." Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library. 28 May 2013. Web. 12 Feb 2014. http://www.prlib.ru/en-us/history/pages/item.aspx?itemid=1042.
Picture: http://qingdynastyyong.blogspot.com/
May 1858